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A NEW CASE FOR DIRECT CONGRESSIONAL REGULATION 
OF GUNS IN SCHOOL ZONES 
MICHAEL A. LAWRENCE * 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The one-year anniversary of the Columbine school shootings in 
Littleton, Colorado provides an appropriate opportunity to explore the 
legal and social issues relating to school violence. While Columbine 
brought the topic of school violence to the forefront of the nation's con-
sciousness in horrifying fashion a year ago last April 20th, it was hardly 
the only school attack or threat of attack that has occurred in the last sev-
eral years. Since 1995 alone there have been school shootings resulting 
in death or injury in Moses Lake, Washington;1 Bethel, Alaska;2 Pearl, 
Mississippi;3 Paducah, Kentucky;4 Stamps, Arkansas;5 Jonesboro, Ar-
kansas;6 Edinboro, Pennsylvania; 7 Fayetteville, Tennessee;8 Springfield, 
* Associate Dean and Professor of Law, Michigan State University, Detroit College of Law. J.D., 
M.S. University of Wisconsin - Madison. The author wrote this Article while visiting at the 
University of Denver College of Law in 1999-2000. Special thanks to Susan J. Hendrick, Erick 
Hohenegger and Chris Rose for their research assistance. 
I. Two students and one teacher were killed, and one other was wounded when 14-year-old 
Barry Loukaitis opened fire on his algebra class in February 1996. Elissa Haney, Lessons In 
Violence: A Timeline of Recent School Shootings, available at 
http://www.infoplease.comlspotlschoolviolencel.html(last visited July 30, 2000) [hereinafter Haney 
http://www.infoplease.comlspotlschoolviolencel.html]. 
2. The school Principal and one student were killed and two others were wounded when 
Evan Ramsey, 16, opened fire at his high school in February 1997. See Haney 
http://www.infoplease.comlspotlschoolviolencel.html. supra note I. 
3. Two students were killed and seven wounded in October 1997 by a 16-year-old who was 
also accused of killing his mother. He and several friends thought to be in on the plot were said to 
be outcasts who worshipped Satan. See Haney 
http://www.infoplease.comlspotlschoolviolencel.html. supra note I. 
4. Three students were killed and five were wounded by a 14-year-old boy as they 
participated' in a prayer circle at Heath High School in December 1997. See Haney 
http://www.infoplease.comlspotlschoolviolencel.html. supra note I. 
5. Two students were wounded in December 1997 when Colt Todd, 14, from his hiding spot 
in the woods, shot at students as they stood in the parking lot. See Haney 
http://www.infoplease.comlspotlschoolviolencel.html. supra note I. 
6. Four students and one teacher were killed and ten others were wounded as they evacuated 
Westside Middle School during a false fire alarm when Mitchell Johnson, 13, and Andrew Golden, 
II, shot at their classmates and teachers from the woods in March 1998. See Haney 
http://www.infoplease.comlspotlschoolviolencel.html. supra note I. 
7. One teacher was killed and two students were wounded when a 14-year-old boy opened 
fire at a dance at James W. Parker Middle School in April 1998. See Haney 
http://www.infoplease.comlspotlschoolviolencel.html. supra note I. 
769 
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Oregon;9 Richmond, Virginia; 10 Littleton, Colorado; II Taber, Alberta, 
Canada; 12 Conyers, Georgia; 13 Fort Gibson, Oklahoma in D~cember 
1999;14 and Mount Morris Township, Michigan in March 2000. 15 
The numbing frequency of these events - nearly 200 reports of 
school shootings resulting in death since 1992, not counting the hundreds 
of copy-cat threats made in dozens of other states during that same pe-
riod - suggests that the problem is approaching epidemic proportions. 
What can be done about this flurry of deadly school attacks? The 
problem stems from teen alienation and anger and, therefore, any lasting 
solution must address both the root sociological causes of the teen al-
ienation and anger that has resulted in the increase in school violence. 
Regardless of the cause-be it lack of parental involvement, teasing 
among students, perpetuation of a havelhave not atmosphere in schools, 
the easy accessibility of violent video games, or any number of other 
societal pressures facing teenagers, the solution must also encompass 
matters of enforcement, including the passage of legislation imposing 
penalties for the possession of guns and other weapons in schools. 
The source of any proposed solution could come from either Con-
gress or individual states. It can be argued on one hand that matters in-
8. One student was killed in the parking lot at Lincoln County High School in May 1998, 
three days before he was to graduate, when he was shot by 18-year-old honor student Jacob Davis, 
his girlfriend's ex-boyfriend. See Haney http://www.infoplease.comlspotlschoolviolencel.html. 
supra note I. 
9. Two students were killed and twenty-two others were wounded in the cafeteria at 
Thurston High School in May 1998 by 15-year-old Kip Kinkel, who had been arrested and released 
to his parents a day earlier, after it was discovered that he had a gun at school. His parents were 
found dead at home. See Haney http://www.infoplease.comlspotlschoolviolencel.html. supra note 
I. 
10. One teacher and one guidance counselor were wounded when they were shot by a 14-
year-old boy in the hallway of a Richmond high school. See Haney 
http://www.infoplease.comlspotlschoolviolencel.html. supra note I. 
II. Fourteen students (including the killers) and one teacher were killed and twenty-three 
others were wounded at Columbine High School in April 1999. Eric Harris, 18, and Dylan Klebold, 
17, had plotted for a year to kill at least 500 people and blow up their school. At the end of their 
hour-long rampage, they turned their guns on . themselves. See Haney 
http://www.infoplease.comlspotlschoolviolencel.html. supra note I. 
12. One student was killed and one was wounded at W. R. Myers High School in April 1999, 
in the first fatal high school shooting in Canada in 20 years. The suspect, a 14-year-old boy, had 
been unhappy at Myers and dropped out in order to begin home schooling. See Haney 
http://www.infoplease.comlspotlschoolviolencel.html. supra note I. 
13. Six students were injured at Heritage High School in May 1999 when they were shot by 
15-year-old T.J. Solomon, who was reportedly depressed after breaking up with his girlfriend. 
Haney, supra note 2. 
14. Four students were wounded and one was severely bruised when a 13-year-old boy 
opened fire in December 1999 with a 9mm semiautomatic handgun at Fort Gibson Middle School. 
See Haney http://www.infoplease.comlspotlschoolviolencel.html. supra note I. 
15. Six-year-old Kayla Rolland was killed when her six-year-old classmate fired a handgun at 
her in class. See Haney http://www.infoplease.comlspotlschoolviolencel.html. supra note I. 
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volving education are of "traditional state concern," so any attempts to 
address the problem should be undertaken-if they are to be undertaken 
by government at all-by the individual states and local subunits. 16 The 
Tenth Amendment l7 is at the root of this concern for the relative author-
ity of Congress vis-a-vis the states. Respect for Tenth Amendment prin-
ciples requires that Congress must be especially sensitive in attempting 
to regulate in areas of "traditional state concern" such as criminal law 
d d . 18 an e ucatlOn. 
On the other hand, one can argue that the increased frequency and 
the very severity of these attacks suggest a crisis of national dimension 
that is beyond the competence of the individual states. 19 A component of 
this argument is that school attacks~pitomized by the spate of recent 
shootings culminating in Columbine-have evolved into nothing less 
than a new form of domestic terrorism,20 thus requiring congressional 
intervention. 
The latter approach raises fundamental constitutional questions con-
cerning Congress's authority to legislate on the matter of school violence. 
It is axiomatic that Conwess may act only pursuant to a power enumer-
ated in the Constitution. I As the Supreme Court stated in U.S. v. Lopez22 
16 Indeed, this was a component of the Supreme Court's reasoning in U.S. v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 
551 (1995) in which the Court held that Congress exceeded its Commerce Power in enacting the 
Gun Free School Zones Act of 1990. See infra notes 31-36 and accompanying text. 
17. "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution ... are reserved to the 
States .... " U.S. CONST. amend. X. 
18. Regarding criminal law, Congress' explicit constitutional authority to regulate in the field 
of criminal law is limited to two types of laws: those that would (I) "provide for the punishment of 
counterfeiting the securities and current coin of the United States" U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, (6); and 
(2) "define and punish piracies and felonies committed on the high seas, and offenses against the law 
of nations." U.S. CONST. Art. I § 8 (10). In addition, the "necessary and proper clause" allows 
Congress to "make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the 
foregoing Powers." U.S. Const. art. I, § 8 (18). Some believe that Congress' use of the necessary 
and proper clause and other provisions of Article I, Section 8 to promulgate and enforce criminal 
laws has gone too far, however "[i]t is questionable whether Congress should arrogate to itself vast 
criminal powers supposedly deriving from the interstate commerce power, or the taxing power. 
Much of the expansion of [the] federal criminal power has taken place as a result of an excessive 
judicial deference to Congress' proclivity for reading the interstate commerce power as a general 
grant oflegislative authority on any subject." Douglas B. Kopel & Joseph Olson, Preventing a Reign 
of Terror: Civil liberties Implications of Terrorism Legislation, 21 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 247, 344 
(1996). 
19. See infra notes 72-74 and accompanying text describing the chilling fact that well over 
600 students could have died at Columbine had all of the killers' bombs been detonated as they had 
planned - a number of deaths 4 times greater than at the bombing of the Alfred Murrah Federal 
Building in Oklahoma City in 1995 -- which has been described as the single most destructive act of 
domestic terrorism in our nation's history. 
20. See infra notes 64 and accompanying text. 
21. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (18). 
22. 514 U.S. 549, 552 (1995). 
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in holding that Congress exceeded its Commerce power in enacting the 
23 . 
Gun Free School Zones Act of 1990: 
The Constitution creates a Federal Government of enumerated pow-
ers. As James Madison wrote, "the powers delegated by the proposed 
Constitution to the federal government are few and defined. Those 
which are to remain in the State governments are numerous and in-
definite." This constitutionally mandated division of authority "was 
adopted by the Framers to ensure protection of our fundamental lib-
erties. Just as the separation and independence of the coordinate 
branches of the Federal Government serve to prevent the accumula-
tion of excessive power in anyone branch, a healthy balance of 
power between the States and the Federal Government will reduce the 
risk of tyranny and abuse from either front.,,24 
Congress has not been completely thwarted in its efforts to limit the 
possession of guns in schools. In addition to several broader pieces of 
existing and proposed legislation that regulate the purchase and posses-
sion of guns, which would of course ultimately affect possession of guns 
in schools,25 The Gun Free School Act of 199426 tied the states' receipt 
of certain funds to their passage, by October 20, 1995, of state laws re-
quiring local educational institutions to expel from school any student 
found in possession of a gun on school grounds.27 
The fact remains, however, that currently there is no uniform na-
tionallaw dealing directly with the possession of guns in schools. Again, 
23. 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(2)(A) (1994). The Act made it a federal offense "for any individual 
knowingly to possess a firearm at a place that the individual knows, or has reasonable cause to 
believe, is a school zone." Lopez, 514 U.S. at 551 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(2)(A). 
24. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 552 (internal citations omitted) (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 45, 
pp.292-293; Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991). 
25. See, e.g., The Youth Handgun Safety Act, 18 U.S.c. 922(x) (1994). The Act was passed 
as 'an amendment to the federal criminal code in 1994 to combat the problems associated with 
juvenile possession of handguns. See 18 U.S.c. 922(x). Part I of the Act prohibits the sale or 
transfer of handguns or handgun ammunition to someone the seller knows, or should know, is a 
juvenile. See id. Part 2 prohibits juveniles from knowingly possessing a handgun or handgun 
ammunition. See id. Part 3 contains exceptions; and Parts 4, 5, and 6 are procedural provisions. See 
id. The Youth Handgun Safety Act was upheld against commerce clause challenge by the Ninth 
Circuit in United States v. Michael R. in 1996, see infra notes 964-109 and accompanying text, but 
to date has not been reviewed by the Supreme Court. See also Brady Handgun Violence Prevention 
Act, Pub. L No. 103-159, 107 Stat. 1536 (1994). 
26. 18 U.S.c. §§ 921-22 (1994). The Act was passed as part of the Improving America's 
Schools Act of 1994, which was part of the reauthorization of the Elementary and Secondary 
Education Act of 1965. The state laws may also permit the local education agency's chief executive 
officer (presumably the superintendent) to modify the expUlsion requirement on a case-by-case 
basis. See 18 U.S.c. §§ 921-22. 
27. Congress is allowed to engage in such "arm-twisting" pursuant to its spending power 
under Article I § 8 (I). See, generally, South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 206 (1987) (upholding 
Congress tying highway funds to the states' passage of laws fixing the minimum drinking age at 21). 
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some will maintain that this is as it should be?8 This Article argues to 
the contrary, however, that the problem of violent attacks in schools has 
reached a critical point whereby direct Congressional intervention is nec-
essary and constitutionally supportable. The landscape of school violence 
is quite different than that of just five years ago when Lopez was decided, 
as became so jarringly evident with the events of Columbine and its af-
termath. To borrow from Justice Stevens' dissent in Lopez, "Whether or 
not the national interest in eliminating [the market for possession of 
handguns by school-age childrenJ would have justified federal legislation 
in [1995], it surely does today.,,2 
This Article proceeds in stages. Section II provides a synopsis of the 
Supreme Court's most recently elucidated position, in Lopez, on the 
matter of direct Congressional regulation of guns in schools, and con-
cludes that the case was decided correctly under principles of federalism 
in the context of the year 1995. Section III recalls the events of Colum-
bine and other school attacks of recent years, and asks whether uniform 
national legislation is necessary in order to address the burgeoning na-
tional crisis of deadly school violence and then suggests that some forms 
of deadly school violence might properly be classified as a new form of 
domestic terrorism. 
Section IV considers possible constitutional justifications for any 
possible new federal legislation banning guns from schools, and also 
briefly discusses broader federal gun statutes that, by extension, reach the 
matter of possession in schools. Based on the foregoing-i.e., in par-
ticular, the stunning increase in the magnitude of the problem of deadly 
school attacks in recent years; the devastating economic and social toll 
that such attacks inflict on victims, families, communities, and the nation 
alike; and the failure of states to adequately address the problem (as 
epitomized by the Colorado legislature's failure to enact meaningful leg-
islation in the wake of Columbine)-Section IV finally concludes that 
the direct national regulation of guns and weapons in school zones is 
necessary at this time to lessen the likelihood of the recurrence of such 
acts of domestic terrorism as occurred at Columbine High School last 
year. 
II. U.S. V. LOPEZw 
A. The Holding 
Congress' previous attempt to regulate directly guns in schools-the 
1990 Gun Free School Zones Act31-was struck down by the Supreme 
28. See supra note 18 and accompanying text. 
29. U.S. v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 602 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
30. 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
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Court in 1995 in Lopez v. United States. 32 In Lopez, a 5-4 majority of the 
Court pointedly noted that the .Act "contains no jurisdictional element 
which would ensure, through case-by-case inquiry, that the firearm pos-
session in question affects interstate commerce .... [and that] 'neither 
the statute nor its legislative history contains express congressional 
findings regarding the effects upon interstate commerce of gun posses-
sion in a school zone.",33 The Court suggested that while "Congress nor-
mally is not required to make formal findings as to the substantial bur-
dens that an activity has on interstate commerce, ... [such] congressional 
findings would enable [the Court to better] evaluate the legislative judg-
ment that the activity in question substantially affected interstate com-
merce, even though no such substantial effect [is] visible to the naked 
eye." 34 
The opinion then went on to state that Congress under its commerce 
power may regulate (1) "the use of the channels of interstate commerce"; 
(2) "the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons or things in 
interstate commerce even though the threat may come only from intra-
state activities"; and (3) "those activities having a substantial relation to 
interstate commerce. ,,35 The Court found unconvincing the government's 
arguments that the possession of guns in school zones "substantially af-
fects" interstate commerce, and thus held that Congress had acted be-
yond its commerce clause authority in passing the Gun Free School Zone 
Act.36 
In arguing unsuccessfully that the Act should be upheld, the Gov-
ernment argued that the Gun Free School Zones Act sufficiently affected 
interstate commerce in two ways: one, violence in general (including in 
31. 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(2)(A) (1994). The Act made it a federal offense "for any individual 
knowingly to possess a firearm at '! place that the individual knows. or has reasonable cause to 
believe. is a school zone." /d. 
32. 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
33. Lopez. 514 U.S. at 561-62 (quoting Brieffor United States 5-6). 
34. Lopez. 514 U.S. at 562-63 (citing Perez v. U.S .. 402 U.S. 146 (1971); Katzenbach v. 
McClung. 379 U.S. 294 (1964). Indeed. a number of commentators suggest that this failure on the 
part of Congress to offer adequate constitutional justification for the Act is the true basis for the 
Court's opinion. See, e.g.. Deborah Jones Merritt. Reflections on United States v. Lopez: 
COMMERCE!. 94 MICH. L. REV. 674, 690 (1995) (commenting that "the important point [of Lopez] 
is that Congress must proceed in a way that recognizes the possibility of some limits and takes the 
doctrine of enumerated powers seriously"); Steven Rosenberg, Note: Just Another Kid With a Gun? 
United States v. Michael R.: Reviewing the Youth Handgun Safety Act Under the United States v. 
Lopez Commerce Clause Analysis, 28 GOLDEN GATE U. L REV. 51. 64. 78 (1998) (stating that 
"Congress' complete failure to justify its intrusion into the traditional state zones of power of 
education and criminal law signaled to the Court that federalism itself was threatened. Underlying 
the Court's decision in Lopez was the Court's belief that Congress should not use the commerce 
power as a general police power"). 
35. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558-59. 
36. See id. at 551. 
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schools) affects the national economy in the sense that insurance costs 
are spread throughout the national population and that people will be less 
willing to travel to parts of the country they perceive to be unsafe;37 and 
two, violence in schools adversely affects the educational process "by 
threatening the learning environment [which in tum] will result in a less 
productive citizenry, [which in tum] will have an adverse effect on the 
Nation's economic well~being.,,38 
In rejecting both of these arguments, the Lopez Court raised the 
following "slippery slope" concerns: 
[U]nder its 'cost of crime' reasoning, ... Congress could regulate not 
only all violent crime, but all activities that might lead to violent 
crime, regardless of how tenuously they relate to interstate commerce. 
Similarly, under the Government's 'national productivity' reasoning, 
Congress could regulate any activity that it found was related to the 
economic productivity of individual citizens: family law (including 
marriage, divorce, and child custody), for example .. " [I]t is diffi-
cult to perceive any limitation on federal power, even in areas such as 
criminal law enforcement or education where States historically have 
been sovereign. Thus, if we are to accept the Government's argu-
ments, we are hard-pressed to posit an~ activity by an individual that 
Congress is without power to regulate. 9 
Moreover, the Court reasoned, a natural extension of the ability to 
regulate "activities that adversely affect the learning environment" would 
be the ability to "mandate a federal curriculum for local elementary and 
secondary schools because what is taught in local schools has a signifi-
cant 'effect on classroom learning,' and that, in tum, has a substantial 
effect on interstate commerce.,,40 The Court rejected the dissent's asser-
tion that "Congress ... could rationally conclude that schools fall on the 
commercial side of the line" (i.e., that schools encompass commercial 
activities to an extent sufficient to justify the exercise of the commerce 
) 41 . h power, commentmg t at: 
[This] rationale lacks any real limits because, depending on the level 
of generality, any activity can be looked upon as commercial. Under 
the dissent's rationale, Congress could just as easily look at child 
rearing as 'falling on the commercial side of the line' because it pro-
vides a 'valuable service - namely to equip [children] with the skills 
they need to survive in life and, more specifically, in the 
42 
workplace. ' 
37. See id. at 563-64. 
38. [d. at 564. 
39. [d. (internal citations omitted). 
40. [d. at 565. 
41. U.S. v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549. 565 (1995). 
42. [d. (internal citations omitted). 
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The Court then commented that while Congress does have the 
authority under its Commerce power "to regulate numerous commercial 
activities that substantially affect interstate commerce and also affect the 
educational process[, t]hat authority, though broad, does not include the 
authority to regulate each and every aspect of local schools. ,,43 
B. Lopez Was Properly Decided 
The Court's holding in Lopez was proper if solely for the fact that 
Congress, in deliberating upon and drafting the Gun Free School Zones 
Act, failed to make any attempt whatsoever to offer justification for how 
the legislation was authorized under the Constitution.44 Only when the 
Act was found to be unconstitutional by the court below 45 did Congress 
begin to offer any sort of constitutional justification for the legislation.46 
Congress's complacency is a result of the extreme deference -
amounting to virtually unchecked authority-given Congress bl the 
Court since 1937 in matters involving the Commerce power.4 The 
Court's deference during the more than half a century following 1937 has 
been largely well-advised in the sense that it has allowed for the passage 
of monumentally important legislation that has, among other things, 
43. /d. at 565-66. Moreover, 
The statute makes the simple possession of a gun within 1,000 feet of the grounds of the 
school a criminal offense. In a sense any conduct in this interdependent world of ours 
has an ultimate commercial origin or consequence, but we have not yet said the 
commerce power may reach so far. If Congress attempts that extension, then at the least 
we must inquire whether the exercise of national power seeks to intrude upon an area of 
traditional state concern .... 
[I]t is well established that education is a traditional concern of the States. The 
proximity to schools, including of course schools owned and operated by the States or 
their subdivisions, is the very premise for making the conduct criminal .... 
While it is doubtful that any State, or indeed any reasonable person, would argue that 
is wise policy to allow students to carry guns on school premises, considerable 
disagreement exists about how best to accomplish that goal. In this circumstance, the 
theory and utility of our federalism are revealed, for the States may perform their role as 
laboratories for experimentation to devise various solutions where the best solution is far 
from clear. (citing New State Ice Co. v. Leibmann, 285 U.S. 262, 31l)(Brandeis, J., 
dissenting). 
/d. at 580-81 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (internal citations ommitted). 
44. See supra note 34 and accompanying text. 
45. United States v. Lopez, 2 F.3d 1342 (5th Cir. 1993). 
46. In the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Congress found that 
"firearms and ammunition move easily in interstate commerce and have been found in increasing 
numbers in and around schools," and that the "occurrence of violent crime in school zones has 
resulted in a decline in the quality of education in our country," resulting in an "adverse impact on 
interstate commerce." 42 U.S.C. 13701; see aLso supra notes 387-38 and accompanying text for the 
Government's justifications in arguing the case. 
47. See generaLLy, ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND PoLICIES 
§ 3.3.4 (1997) (analyzing the Supreme Court decisions pertaining to the commerce clause following 
NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. I, (1937); I LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW L 5-4 (3d ed. 2000) (addressing the Supreme Court's perspective on the 
commerce clause throughout the twentieth century). 
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helped bring the nation out of the Great Depression, improved working 
conditions, and guaranteed protection of civil liberties for tens of mil-
l · fAm' 48 Ions 0 encans. 
That said, principles of federalism 49 suggest that the minimum Con-
gress - a co-equal branch of the federal government with limited Consti-
tutional authority-should be expected to do in exercising its broad 
Commerce power is to explain, at the very least when it is not intuitively 
obvious, the nexus of the regulated activity to interstate commerce. 
Indeed, this very notion may be the most important and lasting as-
pect of Lopez, because it forces Congress to "stay honest" and engage in 
a "self-checking" process as it considers adopting legislation pursuant to 
its Commerce power. In other words, Lopez might be seen as "merely a 
'sort of 'signaling device'-a reminder to Congress that the Court is still 
out there, willing (however reluctantly) to intervene if federal legislators 
become too complacent about extending their authority."'so Some com-
mentators have applauded this outcome, stating, for example, that Lopez 
was an "extraordinary event" marking "a revolutionary and long overdue 
revival" of limiting federal powers.SI 
48. See, e.g., NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. I, 30-49 (1937) (upholding 
unfair labor provisions of the National Labor Relations Act); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 
12S-126 (1941) (sustaining minimum wage and maximum hour provisions of the National Labor 
Relations Act); Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 261 (1964) and Katzenbach v. 
McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 304-30S (1964) (upholding anti-discrimination provisions of the Civil 
Rights Act). 
Id. 
49. See Rosenberg, supra note 34 at S6, stating, 
[F]ederalism is the political theory that two independent, sovereign systems of 
government are better able [than one] to ensure liberty and prosperity. A number of 
rationales explain why this balance of power under federalism is beneficial. These 
rationales include (I) decentralizing power ensures diversity and allows for 
experimentation in governing approaches by the states; (2) placing power in both national 
and state hands protects against tyranny, either from an overly powerful federal 
government or from a local majority exercising power over a local minority; (3) having 
two systems of government increases citizen participation in political affairs and makes 
government entities more accountable to their constituents; and (4) splitting power 
between the national and local governments is the most efficient use of resources because 
the national government can focus on national problems, while local governments can 
concentrate on local concerns. Many consider federalism the greatest American 
innovation to political theory. 
SO. Harry Litman & Mark D. Greenberg, Federal Power and Federalism: A Theory of 
Commerce-Clause Based Regulation of Traditionally State Crimes, 47 CASE W. REs. L. REV. 921, 
922-23 (1997) (quoting from Guns in Schools, 1995: Hearings on S. 890 Before the Subcomm. on 
Youth Violence of the Senate Judiciary Comm., (l99S) (statement of Professor Larry Kramer». See 
also Rosenberg, supra note 34, at 83-84 (commenting that "When Congress makes no attempt to 
show the Court that, at a minimum, it thought about the effects of its regulation on federalism, as in 
Lopez. the Court will treat the regulation as though Congress was threatening federalism itself, and 
the Court will find a way to strike down the law.") 
SI. Steven G. Calabresi, "A Government of Limited and Enumerated Powers": In Defense of 
United States v. Lopez, 94 MICH. L. REV. 752 (l99S). See also Merritt, supra, at 690 (commenting 
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In addition to recognizing Congress's failure to offer constitutional 
justification for the Act, the Lopez opinion also properly suggested that 
there are substantive "outer limits" beyond which the commerce power 
may not extend.52 The Court noted that even in 1937, when it granted 
Congress a broadened commerce power in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin 
53 Steel Corp. ,that commerce power 
must be considered in the light of our dual system of government and 
may not be extended so as to embrace effects upon interstate com-
merce so indirect and remote that to embrace them, in view of our 
complex society, would effectually obliterate the distinction between 
what is national and what is local and create a completely centralized 
54 government. 
Despite the positive effects of judicial acceptance of a broad com-
merce power during the latter half of the Twentieth Century, when Con-
gress attempts to regulate an activity whose connections to interstate 
commerce are so attenuated as to strain credulity, the appropriate 
boundaries in our federalist system of dual sovereignty and shared state-
national authority are inappropriately exceeded. 
By enacting the Gun Free School Zones Act, "a criminal statute that 
by its terms has nothing to do with 'commerce' or any sort of economic 
enterprise, however broadly one might define those terms, [and that] is 
not an essential part of a larger regulation of economic activity, in which 
the regulatory scheme could be undercut unless the intrastate activity 
were regulated",55 Congress went too far. There is no logical stopping 
point if Congress's commerce power extends so far. For example, 
Congress could regulate any activity that it found was related to the 
economic productivity of individual citizens: family law (including 
marriage, divorce, and child custody), for example .... [I]f we are to 
accept the Government's arguments, we are hard-pressed to posit anl 
activity by an individual that Congress is without power to regulate.5 
Such a state of affairs is unacceptable, and the Court properly struck 
down the Act in Lopez. 
that "the important point [of Lopez] is that Congress must proceed in a way that recognizes the 
possibility of some limits and takes the doctrine of enumerated powers seriously."); Ann Althouse, 
Enforcing Federalism After United States v. Lopez, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 793, 813 (1996) (suggesting 
that "Lopez may amount to nothing more than a citation for the commercial/noncommercial 
distinction and the general proposition that the courts do have at least some role, however minimal, 
in limiting Congress to its enumerated powers .... "). 
52. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 556-57 (stating that the commerce power is 
"subject to outer limits"). 
53. 301 U.S. 1(1937). 
54. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 557 (quoting Jones & Loughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1,37 (l937)). 
55. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561. 
56. Id.at 564. 
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Even though-Congress as a coequal branch of government which 
is due great deference in the exercise of its constitutional authority--ob-
viously believed it was necessary to address the issue of guns in schools, 
basic separation of powers principles require that the Court has the final 
responsibility for defining the "outer limits" of Congress's authority.57 
"Whether particular operations affect interstate commerce sufficiently to 
come under the constitutional power of Congress to regulate them is ul-
timately a judicial rather than a legislative question, and can be settled 
finally only by this Court.,,58 Moreover, "[S]imply because Congress 
may conclude that a particular activity substantially affects interstate 
commerce does not necessarily make it so. ,,59 Justice Kennedy, concur-
ring in Lopez, commented that: 
Although it is the obligation of all officers of the Government to re-
spect the constitutional design, the federal balance is too essential a 
part of our constitutional structure and plays too vital a role in secur-
ing freedom for us to admit inability to intervene when one or the 
other level of Government has tipped the scales too far.60 
In sum, it is well-settled constitutional doctrine that it is the Court's 
responsibility for adjusting and fine-tuning the relative responsibilities 
and powers of the co-equal branches of government as disputes arise.61 
By the late Twentieth Century Congress's commerce power had ex-
panded to a point where a correction was necessary, and the Court's Lo-
pez opinion was the appropriate vehicle for such a correction. 
III. DEADLY SCHOOL VIOLENCE AS A FORM OF DOMESTIC TERRORISM 
Eric Harris and Dylan Klebold succeeded in their desire to cause 
mayhem and to achieve notoriety for themselves. By the afternoon of 
their attack on Columbine on April 20, 1999,615 officers from 27 differ-
ent agencies had converged on the scene, together with news organiza-
tions from around the world. Students encountered the media crush, local 
schools were locked down, and a two-mile radius around Columbine was 
blocked off. Frantic parents of Columbine students converged on the area 
looking for their unaccounted children, only to be sent to the public li-
57. So long as a "rational basis" exists for Congress' "concluding that a regulated activity 
sufficiently affected interstate commerce", the regulation would be upheld by the Court. Lopez, 514 
U.S. at 557 (citing Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Assn., Inc., 452 U.S. 264, 276-
280 (1981); Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 155-156 (1971); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 
U.S. 294, 299-301(1964); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 252-253 
(1964». 
58. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 557 n.2 (quoting Heart of Atlanta Motel, 379 U.S. at 273 (Black, 1., 
concurring». 
59. [d. (quoting Hodel, 452 U.S. at 311 (Rehnquist, 1., concurring». 
60. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 578 (Kennedy, 1., concurring). 
61. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803) (stating that "It is emphatically the 
province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is. "). 
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brary and a nearby elementary school. Lists were created and faxed be-
tween the library and the elementary school to aid in reuniting parents 
with their students. Around 4 p.m., the gravity of the attack started. to set 
in. As the day wore on into the night and the number of parents waiting 
to be reunited with their students dwindled. For some of those remaining, 
the unfathomable began to sink in-that their children were the ones still 
in the high school, dead. 
As other investigators began the task of piecing together what hap-
pened at the high school, they found hundreds of backpacks left behind, 
in which pagers were going off. In the library, investigators found bodies 
and blood on the books. In the words of one, "[t]his was a school, a place 
where kids laughed, passed notes, studied" and dreamed of tomorrow.62 
"It was now a place where they had died.,,63 
The magnitude of this tragedy brought seasoned investigators of 
violent crimes to tears and prompted a national soul-searching seeking to 
understand what would drive two teenagers to unleash such a ruthless 
attack on their classmates and teachers. The Columbine massacre dem-
onstrates that some forms of school violence have evolved into nothing 
less than a new form of domestic terrorism.64 
62. Nancy Gibbs & Timothy Roche, The Columbine Tapes, TIME, Dec. 20, 1999, Vol. 154, 
No. 25, available at http://www.time.com/time/magazine/articles.html[hereinafter Gibbs, 
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/articles.htmll. 
63. See Gibbs & Roach, http://www.time.com/timeimagazine/articles.html. supra note 62. 
64. It is possible to be too loose in defining "terrorism", and to react in knee-jerk fashion by 
suggesting ill-advised and overbroad federal enforcement. History suggests that the government has 
overreacted time and again to organizations which have challenged the existing system - such as the 
Alien and Sedition Acts which were enacted in part to respond to the Jeffersonians criticisms of 
President Adams and the Federalists; the relentless suppression of anti-slavery speech by many 
Southern states in response to the extremist rhetoric of some southern abolitionists; and the use of 
conspiracy and criminal syndicalism laws to suppress labor organizers, Communists, and civil rights 
activists. The temptation must be resisted to have government "crack down" in a way that would 
unnecessarily abridge civil liberties. See Kopel & Olson, supra note 18, at 252-55. Kopel and 
Olson suggest: 
[Ilt is easy for many Americans to see, in hindsight, the legitimacy of the viewpoint of 
the Jeffersonians, of southern abolitionists, of labor organizers, and of the civil rights 
movement, it is not so easy for some Americans to respect the current concerns of their 
fellow citizens. Today, there are many tens of millions of people who are terrified of the 
government, and many thousands (or perhaps more) who participate in militias. To 
follow the voices of those who urge us to ... crack down on radicals with unorthodox 
views would be the most dangerous course. Respectful dialogue and reform, not 
stereotyping and repression, are the courses that history will judge wisest .... Everything 
that terrorists do is already illegal. Current laws already provide ample authority for 
investigations of potential terrorists, including persons who have done nothing more than 
talk big. Various proposals that are offered as supposed solutions to terrorism -
including more spying on peaceful dissidents, more electronic surveillance, trials with 
secret evidence, felonizing charitable donations to foreign humanitarian causes, and 
federalizing and militarizing criminal law - will make America more dangerous, not 
safer. Releasing the federal government from the strict Constitutional rule of law would, 
in the long run, facilitate state terrorism. 
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According to the FBI, terrorism is "the unlawful use of force or 
violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a govern-
ment, the civilian popUlation, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of 
political or social objectives," with the perpetrators' motivation or intent 
as the key factor.65 If, therefore, the perpetrators target a sector of the 
public in order to instill fear and to cause a political or social change, the 
act is one of terrorism under the FBI's definition.66 
For its part, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) 
defines terrorism as "the use of force or violence against persons or 
property in violation of criminal law for purposes of intimidation, coer-
cion or ransom.,,67 The FEMA materials suggest that terrorists "often use 
threats to create fear among the public to try to convince citizens that 
their government is powerless to prevent terrorism and to get immediate 
publicity for their causes.,,68 Moreover, 
a terrorist attack can take several fonns, depending on the technologi-
cal means available to the terrorist, the nature of the political issue 
motivating the attack, and the points of weakness of the terrorist's tar-
get. Bombings are the most frequently used terrorist method in the 
United States. Other possibilities includes an attack at transportation 
facilities, an attack against utilities or other public services or an inci-
dent involving chemical or biological agents.69 
After Columbine, it is necessary to add "attack on a school" to the 
list of possibilities for terrorist attacks. The attack on the students and 
staff at Columbine High School fits the FBI and FEMA definitions for 
terrorism.70 Dylan Klebold and Eric Harris were "picked on," and they 
Kopel, supra at 255-56, 346. These are wise words, and Congress would do well to heed them 
whenever it is tempted to pass any new laws designed to counter terrorism. That said, a law that 
would prohibit the possession of guns in schools does not raise the sorts of concerns addressed above 
- a school gun possession statute simply does not in any way abridge civil liberties in the way that 
other more invasive statutes might. 
65. See Interview by Susan Hendrick with Mark Holstlaw, special agent, Denver FBI field 
office, Denver, Co. (February 23, 2000). 
66. If, by contrast, the motivation is simply a personal agenda, such as to "get back at" an ex-
girlfriend of ex-boyfriend, one would be hard-pressed to classify such an act as terrorism. See 
Interview by Susan Hendrick with Mark Holstlaw, special agent, Denver FBI field office, Denver, 
Co. (February 23, 2000). 
67. FEMA: BACKGROVNDER - TERRORISM, available at 
http://www.fema.govllibrary/terror.html (last modified Jan. 10, 1998). 
68. FEMA, supra note 67, available at http://www.fema.govllibrary/terror.html According to 
FEMA, "most terrorist incidents in the United States have involved small extremist groups who use 
terrorism to achieve a designated objective. . .. In recent years the largest number of terrorist 
strikes have occurred in the Western States and Puerto Rico. Attacks in Puerto Rico accounted for 
about 60 percent of all terrorist incidents between 1983 and 1991 that occurred on United States 
territory." Id. 
69. Id. 
70. See supra notes 65-69 and accompanying text. The FBI is called in whenever a situation 
involves interstate commerce, explosives or hostages, and once the area is secured. In the case of 
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retaliated against a sector of the public-i.e., students and teachers-in 
order to foment "a revolution" of social change?1 Investigators found 
over 80 bombs in Columbine High School.72 "Some were pipe bombs. 
Others were fashioned out of propane canisters and C02 (carbon diox-
ide) cartridges. Investigators even found some explosives containing 
homemade napalm, a jellied form of gasoline.,,73 Investigators also found 
bombs in the cars and gym bags of both Harris and Klebold. 
The FBI agents delicately looked inside the bags -- and instantly un-
derstood the true intentions of Dylan Klebold and Eric Harris: death, 
by fire, for hundreds of their fellow students. The gym bags each held 
a large bomb fashioned from a barbecue grill propane tank, a gasoline 
can and other fuel cylinders. Each was wired to a pipe bomb. A two-
bell alarm clock served as a timing device. Had both bombs not 
failed, explosives experts concluded, the 660 kids in the cafeteria at 
11 :20 a.m. on April 20 likely would have died-nearly four times the 
number killed in the Oklahoma City bombing.74 
It is a sad fact that after Columbine it can no longer be said that the 
threat of attack upon a school is an extremely rare occurrence. In the four 
weeks following Columbine, for example, there were 350 arrests for 
threats and bomb scares upon schools, with at least 30 of those arrests 
involving an actual bomb or weapon.75 
Columbine, there were both hostages and over ninety explosives. In addition, local law enforcement 
lacked the resources or experience to deal with the crisis and the subsequent investigation, so the 
FBI was summoned. See Interview by Susan Hendrick with Mark Holstlaw, special agent, Denver 
FBI field office, Denver, Co. (February 23, 2(00). 
71. Gibbs & Roche, supra note 62. "Harris and Klebold have an inventory of their ecumenical 
hatred: all 'niggers, spics, Jews, gays, f_ing whites' the enemies who abused them and the friends 
who didn't do enough to defend them ... 'I hope we kill 250 of you,''' Klebold said, predicting that 
the attack would be the most "'nerve-racking 15 minutes of my life, after the bombs are set and 
we're waiting to charge through the school. Seconds will be like hours. I can't wait. I'll be shaking 
like a leaf. '" Harris and Klebold expressed their hope to live forever in memory and nightmares: 
"'We're going to kick-start a revolution,'" Harris said, and "'create flashbacks from what we 
do ... and drive [the survivors] insane.'" Id. 
72. Dan Luzadder & KevinVaughan, Amassing the Facts, DENVER ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS, 
Dec. 13, 1999, available at http://www.denver.rmn.com!shootinglI2J3coll.shtml. 
73. Luzadder & Vaughan, supra note 72 available at 
http://www.denver.rmn.com!shooting/1213coI1.shtml .. 
74. [d. 
75. Steve Drummond, Arrests Top 350 in Threats, Bomb Scares, EDUCATION WEEK, May 26, 
1999, available at http://www.edweek.orglewI1999/37threat.hI8. "This is a terroristic activity that 
needs to be taken seriously." [d. (quoting Ronald D. Stephens, Executive Director, National School 
Safety Center). "Many Communities are no longer taking teenage threats lightly. In Texas, four 8th 
grade boys were arrested for conspiracy to commit murder, conspiracy to commit arson, conspiracy 
to manufacture explosives after teachers and students overheard conversations about an attack on the 
school. In another Texas town, 4 teens were arrested after police found bomb making materials in 
the back seat and trunk of the car the boys were in." http://www.angelfire.com (visited Feb. 12, 
2000). In Jefferson County, Colorado, the home of Columbine, eight students were expelled from 
the Jefferson County School district for making threats. See 
.r 
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The mere threat of a Columbine-type attack is enough to gain wide-
spread media attention and virtually shut down entire communities. A 
troubled adolescent with a desire to "send a message" or seeking venge-
ance of some sort intends these effects76-just as any other terrorist in-
tends his actions to impose maximum damage and to garner widespread 
publicity for his cause. True enough, gun-toting adolescents do not fit the 
typical "terrorist" profile, but the effect of their actions and threats on the 
average American is no less real - indeed, the effect is more real due to 
its immediacy-than the amorphous threat of a stereotypical foreign ter-
rorist carrying out some sort of "traditional" terrorist activity such as a 
car-bombing or the like.77 Moreover, the fact that some (or even most) 
threats or attacks are carried out by adolescents with a twisted desire for 
fame78 or simply by confused kids who are lashing out in a highly inap-
propriate way (the latter do not constitute acts of terrorism) does not di-
minish the damaging effect of the act on the community and the nation as 
http://www.salon.com/newsJfeatureJ 1999/121 16!columbine/indexlhtml (visited Dec. 16, 1999). 
Moreover, others besides Harris and Klebold were plotting in late 1998 and early 1999. In 
November 1998, for example, in Burlington, WI, 
five students, all boys aged 15 and 16, were arrested for conspiracy to commit murder. 
Two of the boys were subsequently released as they had dropped out of the conspiracy 
before the arrests. The plot to take the staff of the school hostage and kill some of them, 
as well as killing twelve other children, came apart when police intervened and arrested 
the boys the day before the plot was scheduled to happen. A police video of the 
interrogation did not show Miranda warnings being given, so the confessions of the three 
boys were not allowed at trial. All three plead to lesser offenses .... Initially, many of the 
townspeople felt that the police over-reacted, and that the situation was blown out of 
proportion. One mother thought the 'hysteria' was unreasonable. Six months later, after 
Columbine, parents and school officials believe they narrowly missed a major disaster. 
http://www.angelfire.com(visitedFeb. 12,2000). 
76. Gibbs & Roche, supra note 62. '''Do not think we're trying to copy anyone,'" Eric Harris 
warned, recalling the school shootings in Oregon and Kentucky. Harris suggested that he and Dylan 
Klebold had the idea long ago, "'before the first one ever happened. '" [d. They also bragged that 
their plan was better, "not like those f __ s in Kentucky with camouflage and .22s. Those kids were 
only trying to be accepted by others." [d. 
77. As discussed supra note 68 and accompanying text, such acts of terrorism on U.S. soil are 
rare. 
78. Such a child knows that carrying out a school shooting will get him on the evening news 
and perhaps even lead to Hollywood making a movie about him. "'They wanted to be famous,' 
concludes FBI agent Mark Holstlaw. 'And they are. They're infamous.' It used to be said that living 
well is the best revenge; for these two, it was to kill and die in a spectacular fashion." Gibbs & 
Roche, supra note 62. Fame was not Harris's and K1ebold's sole motivation, though: 
Because they were steeped in violence and drained of mercy, they could accomplish 
everything at once; payback to those who hurt them, and glory, the creation of a cult, for 
all those who have suffered and been cast out. They wanted movies made of their story, 
which they had carefully laced with 'a lot of foreshadowing and dramatic irony,' as 
Harris put it. There was a poem he wrote, imagining himself as a bullet. 'Directors will 
be fighting over this story,' Klebold said - and the boys chewed over which could be 
trusted with the script: Steven Spielberg or Quentin Tarantino. 'You have two 
individuals who wanted to immortalize themselves,' says Holstlaw. 'They wanted to be 
martyrs and to document everything they were doing,' 
to the point where they even made a video on the morning of the shooting describing their feelings, 
apologizing to their parents and bequeathing their favorite belongings. [d. 
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a whole, whose sense of well-being and safety is shaken to the core by 
these events. 
IV. CONGRESSIONAL LEGISLATION IS NECESSARY 
Given all of the above, what, if anything, should be done? One thing 
is clear-guns and schools do not mix, and new strategies must be 
adopted to prevent the recurrence of the events that occurred last year at 
Columbine and in its wake?9 One area of focus that is receiving renewed 
attention is so-called "preventive" legislation, ranging from measures that 
would encourage strategies initiated within the family itself to those that 
h . b d' so t at are more commumty- ase 10 nature. 
Beyond the possible promulgation of such preventive measures, it is 
important to consider what sort of "enforcement" mechanisms are neces-
sary, and whether legislation establishing these mechanisms should be 
promulgated at the local, state or federal level. Whether it should be 
Congress or the states who will take the lead in legislating the possession 
of guns in schools is a matter of considerable controversy. While Con-
gressional deference to state primacy in regulating activities touching 
upon matters of "traditional state concern" such as education and crimi-
nallaw is to be desired and preferred in most circumstances,sl our feder-
alist system of dual sovereignty authorizes the national government to 
become involved pursuant to a power enumerated in the Constitution 
when a particular problem--even one concerning a subject that is "tradi-
tionally a state concern"-grows to such a dimension as to seriously 
harm the nation's economy and overall well-being.s2 In such circum-
stances, if the states simply are unable -whether through their own inher-
ent limitations as only single entities among fifty, or through an absence 
of political will-to address the £roblem effectively, it is appropriate for 
Congress to step into the breach. 3 
79. See supra note 62 and accompanying text. 
SO. Herein lies the potential for significant debate as well - i.e., should government have a 
role in becoming involved in "family" and "child-rearing" issues, and if so, what level of government 
- local, state, or federal - should take primary responsibility? Such questions are beyond the scope of 
this article, so the article does not venture into this particular hornet's nest, other than to say that the 
soul-searching that has been prompted by Columbine on the topics of the family's and community's 
role in mitigating problems of teen alienation is useful and necessary. As a society, we need to 
address the problems facing our youth as they negotiate the difficult transitions from adolescence to 
adulthood. 
SI. See, e.g., Kopel & Olson, supra note IS at 343-48 and accompanying text. 
S2. See supra note 80 for discussion of the "which came first - the chicken or the egg?" 
nature of the purpose of the legislation. 
S3. As of 1995, a total of 40 states did regulate guns in schools in some way, Lopez, 514 U.S. 
at 5S1 (Kennedy, J., concurring), but the lack of a national standard leads to uncertainty and 
ignorance of what the law is in any given state. State laws vary widely. In Colorado, the very state 
where Columbine High School is located, the legislature failed to pass meaningful gun control 
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Columbine forever changed the dimensions of the issue of gun pos-
session in schools. Whereas before Columbine it was debatable whether 
Congress should have a role in regulating guns in schools,84 the brave 
new post-Columbine world cries out for national control. 
In the post-Columbine world, it is eminently reasonable for one to 
conclude, while still maintaining fidelity to federalist principles of a lim-
ited national government and a meaningful Tenth Amendment, that Con-
gress may regulate guns in schools. Guns simply have no place in 
schools, and especially with Columbine and its aftermath there is little 
question that guns in schools have substantial negative effects on the 
nation's economy to the point where Congressional exercise of the com-
merce power would be justified-even after Lopez. 
While it is arguably true that the commerce power has been used by 
Congress for too long as a virtual "blank check" for justifying legislation 
beyond its natural constitutional boundaries, the fact remains that Article 
One of the Constitution does grant Congress the affirmative power "to 
regulate Commerce ... among the several states. ,,85 It has long been rec-
ognized that the commerce power is not to be read in its most narrow 
sense - i.e., it encompasses far more than mere commercial traffic: 
Commerce, undoubtedly, is traffic, but it is something more: it is in-
tercourse . . .. [The commerce power] is the power to regulate; that 
is, to prescribe the rule by which commerce is to be governed. This 
power, like all others vested in Congress, is complete in itself, may be 
exercised to its utmost extent, and acknowledges no limitations, other 
than are prescribed in the constitution.86 
That such a regulation may survive constitutional scrutiny is not 
certain,87 of course, but there are a number of reasons to believe it would 
legislation in the year following the massacre. For example, on February II, 2000 the Colorado 
House Appropriations Committee killed HB 1242, which would have required background checks for 
all buyers at gun shows. A former girlfriend of Harris's bought a couple of the guns used in the 
attack at a gun show. Ordinarily, "experimentation" by the states is to be lauded and encouraged, as 
described by Justice Brandeis in his dissenting opinion in New State Ice Co. v. Liebman, 
. To stay experimentation in things social and economic is a grave responsibility. Denial 
of the rights to experiment may be fraught with serious consequences to the Nation. It is 
one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State may, if its 
citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments 
without risk to the rest of the country. 
Liebman, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). However, with the advent of the 
Columbine-type school massacre, the problem of violence in schools has gone beyond the point 
where a single state should be allowed to serve as a "laboratory" - when potentially hundreds of 
children die, communities are terrified, and interstate commerce is adversely affected, Congressional 
preemption is necessary. 
84. See supra notes 22-24 and accompanying text for discussion of Lopez, in which the Court 
held in 1995 that Congress does not have a role. 
85. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, el. 3. 
86. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 189, 196 (1824). 
87. See supra note 83 and accompanying text for "source of legal uncertainty" language. 
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be upheld. For example, even before Columbine, in its 1997 United 
States v. Michael R. opinion, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals sub-
jected another federal "gun possession" statute (i.e., the Youth Handgun 
Safety Act-Congress' regulation of juvenile possession of handguns) to 
rigorous post-Lopez scrutiny and upheld the statute, concluding that the 
statute and facts were distinguishable from Lopez. Granted, Michael R. is 
not an opinion of the Supreme Court, and the statute does not specifically 
involve gun possession in schools, but there are enough parallels be-
tween the statute upheld in Michael R. and a statute that would regulate 
possession in schools to conclude that the latter would have a good 
chance in surviving judicial scrutiny. 
A. Federal Measures - Constitutional Authority 
In light of the magnitude of the problem, from an enforcement per-
spective it is time for Congress to take action to establish a uniform fed-
eral penalty for the act of bringing a gun onto school grounds. Current 
federal laws, such as the Gun Free School Act,88 and other broader gun-
related statutes such as the Youth Handgun Safety Act,89 and the Brady 
Bill,90 while effective in their own rights, do not adequately address and 
target the specific problem of guns in schools. Nor do individual state 
laws-many of which fall far short in their attention to the issue of guns 
possession among youth--do enough in addressing the national scope of 
the problem. 
The problem on the ground, in real life, is severe. After Columbine, 
kids and families are fearful. Just as earlier problems of, for example, 
unfair working conditions began to harm the nation's economic well-
being to a degree that the Court finally agreed that Congressional inter-
vention was warranted,91 the Columbine massacre and its aftermath have 
transformed the matter of gun possession in schools from the occasional 
isolated incident of a troubled youngster shooting his classmate(s)92 into 
a problem that has substantial negative impacts on the national economy. 
Columbine thus marks a turning point where the Court would be 
justified in concluding that Congress does have the constitutional 
authority and the necessary "rational basis" (at least)93 for believing that 
88. 18 u.s.c. § 921 (1994). See supra note 26 and accompanying text. 
89. 18 u.s.c. § 922(x) (1994). See supra note 25 and accompanying text. 
90. Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act, Pub. L No. 103-159, 107 Stat. 1536 (1994) .. 
See supra note 25 and accompanying text. 
91. See supra notes 64, 82and accompanying text 
92. Tragic though events such as the murder in Spring 2000 of a 6 year old Michigan girl by a 
first grade classmate are, Keith Naughton and Evan Thomas, Did Kayla Have to Die?, NEWSWEEK, 
March 13,2000, at 24, they are not acts of "domestic terrorism," and probably do not by themselves justify Congressional intervention. See supra note 64 and accompanying text. 
93. See infra note 110 and accompanying text for description of standard of review. 
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regulation of gun possession in schools would further the legitimate gov-
ernment interest of preventing the recurrence of such terrorist acts and 
threats that do so much harm to the national economy and to the indi-
viduals, families and communities involved. 
1. United States v. Michael R.94 
Any new federal legislation attempting to regulate the possession of 
guns in schools must be promulgated with the principles of Lopez firmly 
in mind. Given the Court's disapproval of the statute at issue in Lopez, in 
which the Court asserted that "the possession of a gun in a local school 
zone is in no sense an economic activity that might, through repetition 
elsewhere, substantially affect any sort of interstate commerce,,,95 is it 
possible for Congress to craft any sort of legislation regulating guns in 
schools that would survive constitutional scrutiny? A more recent opin-
ion of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals would seem to suggest that the 
answer is "Yes," provided the measure meets certain requirements. 
In United States v. Michael R,96 the Ninth Circuit upheld a provi-
sion of the Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act prohibiting the knowing 
and intentional possession of a handgun by a juvenile97 against constitu-
tional challenge,98 stating that" 18 U.S.c. 922(x)(2) is different" from 
section 922 (q).99 
An analysis of the court's reasoning in distinguishing section 
922(x)(2) from section 922(q) is crucial to the understanding of how a 
statute that prohibits the possession of guns in schools might be crafted 
to survive constitutional attack. The court first noted that section 
922(x)(2) is "part of a larger, more comprehensive regulation to curb the 
bustling underground market in firearms and drugs." I 00 Specifically, 
section 922(x)(2) 
94. 90 F.3d 340 (9th Cir. 1996). 
95. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567. 
96. 90 F.3d 340 (9th Cir. 1996). 
97. 18 U.S.C. § 922(x)(2) (1994). 
98. The defendant challenged the constitutionality of section 922(x)(2) on the grounds that it 
is, like the statute that was at issue and struck down in Lopez (section 922(q)), "criminal statute that 
by its terms has nothing to do with 'commerce' or any sort of economic enterprise." Michael R., 90 
F.3d at 343 (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561). "Furthermore, [the defendant] maintains that section 
922(x)(2) has no 'jurisdictional element' which would operate to ensure that, on a case-by-case basis, 
there was an effect on interstate commerce." Michael R .. , 90 F.3d at 343 (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 
561). 
99. Section 922( q) was the statute reviewed and struck down in Lopez. 
100. Michael R., 90 F.3d at 344. The Ninth Circuit noted the comparison to section 922(q), 
which the Supreme Court in Lopez commented was designed to regulate an activity (possession of a 
gun in a local school zone) that "is in no sense an economic activity that might, through repetition 
elsewhere, substantially affect any sort of interstate commerce." /d. at 344 (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. 
at 567). 
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is part of a larger regulation [Section 922(x)] that deals with the sale, 
delivery, or transfer of firearms to a juvenile .... Read as a whole, 
section 922(x) by its terms regulates commerce: subsection (1) is tar-
geted at curbing the supply of handguns and suitable ammunition,101 
while subsection (2) restricts the demand for those firearms. 102 We 
find that under the statute, Congress is in effect regulating interstate 
commerce by attacking both the supply and demand for firearms with 
. '1 lOY respect to Juvem es. 
Second, the court concluded that "possession of a handgun by a juvenile, 
as a general matter, could have a substantial effect on interstate com-
merce."I04 The court based this conclusion in part on the legislative his-
tory of Section 922(x),105 which suggested that: 
Congress enacted this statute to help control crime "by stopping 
commerce in handguns with juveniles nationwide." Congress de-
fended the enactment of this statute as consistent with the Commerce 
Clause on three grounds: (a) the movement of the component parts, 
ammunition, and raw materials in interstate commerce; (b) the deter-
rence effect of violent crime on the travel of ordinary citizens and 
foreigners; and (c) the related effort to control gun possession and 
106 drug flow. 
The court found justifications (a) and (b) to be self-explanatory: 
"possession of a handgun by a juvenile implicates interstate commerce 
through the manufacturing process and by its deterrent effect on inter-
state travel;,,107 and justification (c) to be valid as well, based on the 
logical nexus between Congress's regulation of the sale, transfer and pos-
10 I. Subsection (I) provides: "It shall be unlawful for a person to sell, deliver, or otherwise 
transfer to a person who the transferor knows or has reasonable cause to believe is a juvenile- (A) a 
handgun; or (B) ammunition that is suitable for use only in a handgun." 18 U.S.c. § 922(x)(I). 
102 Subsection (2) provides: "It shall be unlawful for any person who is a juvenile to knowingly 
possess- (A) a handgun; or (B) ammunition that is suitable for use only in a handgun." 18 V.S.c. § 
922(x)(2). 
103. Michael R., 90 F.3d at 344. 
104. ld. The court also cites to a federal district court opinion that reaches the same 
conclusion: "The District Court of Massachusetts found that 18 U.S.c.§ 922(x) impacts the handgun 
market by excluding juvenile participation; it concluded that because of section 922(x),s effects on 
the supply and demand of handguns, the statute fits within Congess's constitutional authority to 
regulate commerce." [d. at 344 n.2 (citing United States v. Cardoza, 914 F.Supp 683, 687 (D.Mass. 
1996». 
105. The court alluded in a footnote to Lopez's approval of the judiciary's recourse to 
legislative history "as part of its independent evaluation of constitutionality under the Commerce 
Clause." Michael R., 90 F.3d at 345 n.3. See supra note 34 and accompanying text for the Lopez 
Court's comments on this topic. 
106. Michael R, 90 F.3d at 344-45 (quoting H.R. CONF. REP. No. 103-711, at 390-91 (1994), 
reprinted in 1994 V.S.C.C.A.N. 1858, 1859). 
107. Michael R., 90 F.3d at 345. 
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session of handguns by juveniles to its efforts curb the illegal flow of 
d d fi " 108 rugs an lrearms In Interstate commerce. 
In sum, the analysis undertaken by the Ninth Circuit in Michael R. 
serves as a useful template for understanding how a federal law prohib-
iting the possession of guns in schools might survive after Lopez. It is 
fair bet that the reasoning of the Michael R. court would not be accepted 
by an unanimous Supreme Court, but it is quite likely that it would be 
accepted by a majorityl09_and that, as they say, is all it takes for the 
Court to uphold a challenged law. 
2. The necessary contours of any new proposed legislation 
If it is to survive constitutional scrutiny, any federal legislation spe-
cifically regulating the possession of guns in schools of course must dif-
fer fundamentally from the Gun Free School Zones Act struck down in 
Lopez. In short, Congress must ask whether (and then affirmatively con-
clude) the subject of the regulation falls within its limited scope of 
authority and then, practically speaking, it must be able to defend its 
legislation convincingly in the likely event the legislation is 
challenged. I 10 
Justice Stevens' dissenting OpInIOn in Lopez, though by far the 
shortest of any of the opinions in the case, implicitly identifies a key 
component of any successful school gun-control legislation, when he 
states that "[t]he market for the possession of handguns by school-age 
108. The court noted Congress' statement that "[v)iolent crime and the use of illicit drugs go 
hand-in-hand, and attempts to control one without controlling the other may be fruitless." [d. 
(quoting H.R. CONF. REP. No. 103-711, at 390-91 (1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1858, 
1859). 
109. While it is true that denial of certiorari by the Supreme Court does not have formal 
precedential value, denial of cert. does have practical value to the extent that it can be understood 
that at least six Justices believed that the holding below was not so objectionable as to require the 
Court's review. Accordingly, when the Court denied certiorari in Michael R., [cannot find denied 
cert citation), it was because at least six Justices concluded that the Ninth Circuit's upholding of 
Section 922(x) of the Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act was not so objectionable as to require 
review. 
110. Although the appropriate judicial standard of review for any legislation not involving a 
"fundamental right" (or "suspect classification" in equal protection claims) is "rational basis" review 
- i.e .. the legislation is presumed to be constitutional, and will be upheld so long as Congress had a 
"rational basis" for believing the legislation was within its authority - the reality is that the Court 
seemed in Lopez to employ a standard somewhat more searching than is typical with highly-
deferential rational basis review. Regardless of whether or not one believes the Court overstepped 
the boundaries of judicial review by applying this "rational basis-plus" standard, Congress needs to 
assume the Court will continue to examine its legislation (particularly that enacted under the 
commerce power) more critically than it had in the past. Indeed, in the scope of things, this is 
probably a good thing: as suggested supra notes 47-52 and accompanying text, constitutional 
principles of separation of powers and federalism argue in favor of the Court stepping in to 'keep 
Congress honest" in those times when Congress becomes too complacent and casual in its exercise 
of its limited powers. 
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children is, distressingly, substantial." III Conceptually, the proper way to 
think of any new measure seeking to regulate the possession of guns in 
schools is to understand that, while a criminal statute, the law by its 
terms is seeking to dry up a particular market-i.e., the interstate market 
for guns among school-age children. For example, if Congress concludes 
on the basis of available information that when the federal penalties for 
possessing guns in schools become so onerous as to convince a person 
who might otherwise consider purchasing a gun-the component parts, 
ammunition, and raw materials of which largely traveled in interstate 
commerce-not to consummate that transaction, the demand side of this 
particular market is affected. Multiply the decision of a single individual 
not to buy by the similar decisions of hundreds and thousands of other 
individuals, and one starts to see how a federal measure designed to im-
pose harsh penalties on an individual possessing a gun in a school does 
in fact regulate "an economic activity that might, through repetition 
elsewhere, substantially affect ... interstate commerce." 1\ 2 
Moreover, under a conceptual framework that views gun-control 
legislation as a mechanism for reducing the "demand-side" of the market, 
a specific regulation of gun possession in schools can be said to be a 
smaller 'component of the larger regulatory scheme of "stopping com-
merce in handguns with juveniles nationwide,,113 (after all, most students 
in schools are juveniles), which itself is a smaller component of the 
larger regulatory scheme of to help control crime. This is essentially the 
approach taken by Congress with the Juvenile Delinquency Act (regu-
lating possession of handguns by juveniles) reviewed and upheld by the 
Ninth Circuit in Michael R. 114 
Just as the provision of the Juvenile Delinquency Act regulating 
possession of handguns by juveniles reviewed in Michael R. (section 
922(x)(2»"5 was found to be "part of a larger, more comprehensive 
regulation to curb the bustling underground market in firearms and 
drugs,,,116 a provision regulating the possession of guns in schools ar-
guably is part of the same "larger, more comprehensive regulation.,,1l7 
Extrapolating from the Ninth Circuit's reasoning in Michael R. that "pos-
session of a handgun by a juvenile implicates interstate commerce 
through the manufacturing process and by its deterrent effect on inter-
state travel,,,IIS and that regulating the sale, transfer and possession of 
Ill. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 603 (Stevens, 1., dissenting)(italics added). 
112. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567 .. 
113. See supra note 106 and accompanying text. 
114. See supra notes 94-100 and accompanying text. 
115. See supra notes 94-100 and accompanying text. 
116. U.S. v. Michael R., 90 F.3d 340, 344 (9th Cir. 1996). 
117. Michael R., 90 F.3d at 344. 
118. Id. at 345. 
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handguns by juveniles is substantially tied to Congress' efforts to curb 
the illegal flow of drugs and firearms in interstate commerce, the regula-
tion of gun possession in schools can be said to be a component part of 
those arguments. Finally, there's no reason to believe that Congress' ob-
servation that "violent crime and the use of illicit drugs go hand-in-hand, 
and attempts to control one without controlling the other may be fruit-
less"119 applies any less in the school setting than it does elsewhere, a 
supposition that lends additional support for the proposition that Con-
gress would be constitutionally justified in regulating the possession of 
guns in schools. 
The foregoing "smaller component of the larger effort to curb vio-
lent crime and drug use" and market-based "demand-side" arguments, 
together with the additional congressional purpose of seeking to mini-
mize the threat and recurrence of acts that amount to domestic terrorism 
in schools, coupled also with a requirement that the guns (or some com-
ponent part, raw material or ammunition thereof) must have traveled in 
interstate commerce, all bolster the case for the constitutionality of a 
regulation prohibiting gun possession in schools. All of these factors 
combined serve to neutralize the "slippery slope" concerns l20 raised by 
the Lopez Court-Le., legislation with these components does not give 
rise to the possibility whereby Congress would use the legislation as a 
springboard for, for example, (I) using a "cost-of-crime" rationale to 
justify "regulating not only all violent crime, but all activities that might 
lead to violent crime, regardless of how tenuously they relate to interstate 
commerce"; (2) using a "national productivity" rationale to justify 
"regulating any activity that it found was related to the economic pro-
ductivity of individual citizens" such as family law (including marriage, 
divorce, and child custody)"; and (3) using an "adverse effect on learning 
environment" rationale to justify "mandating a federal curriculum for 
local elementary and secondary schools because what is taught in local 
schools has a significant 'effect on classroom learning,' and that, in tum, 
has a substantial effect on interstate commerce.,,121 In other words, school 
gun control legislation based on the factors described above would be 
adequately circumscribed and discrete so as to assuage the Court's con-
cern that Congress is in some way opening a Pandora's Box of over-
reaching legislation. 
3. Distinguishing Lopez 
In elucidating the current parameters of the commerce power in the 
course of striking down the Gun Free School Zones Act in Lopez, the 
Court made several important qualifying statements that "left the door 
119. [d. (quoting H.R. CONF. REP. No. 103-711. at 390-91 (1994), reprinted in 1994 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1858, 1859). 
120. See supra notes 39-42 and accompanying text. 
121. U.S. v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 565 (1995); see supra notes 39-42 and accompanying text. 
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open" to the possibility that it would uphold similar legislation under 
different circumstances. For example, the Court commented that: 
We do not doubt that Congress has authority under the Commerce 
Clause to regulate numerous commercial activities that substantially 
affect interstate commerce and also affect the educational process. 
That authority, though broad, does not include the authority to regu-
late each and every aspect of local schools.122 
Moreover, 
Admittedly, a determination whether an intrastate activity is commer-
cial or noncommercial may in some cases result in legal uncertainty. 
But, so long as Congress' authority is limited to those powers enu-
merated in the Constitution, and so long as those enumerated powers 
are interpreted as having judicially enforceable outer limits, congres-
sional legislation under the Commerce Clause always will engender 
"legal uncertainty." ... Congress has operated within this framework 
of legal uncertainty ever since this Court determined that it was the 
judiciary's duty "to say what the law is." ... These are not precise 
formulations, and in the nature of things they cannot be. 123 
Finally, 
[Here, r]espondent was a local student at a local school; there is no 
indication that he had recently moved in interstate commerce, and 
there is no requirement that his possession of the firearm have any 
concrete tie to interstate commerce. 124 
One can conclude from these statements that the Court, at least im-
plicitly, believes that (1) Congress does have the authority to regulate 
some aspects of local schools (i.e., those aspects involving commercial 
activities substantially affecting interstate commerce); (2) because the 
process of determining whether a certain aspect of local schools does or 
does not involve "commercial activities substantially affecting interstate 
commerce" is not a "bright-line" legal test, such determinations should 
be made on a case-by-case basis, and categorical statements should be 
resisted; and (3) if facts exist where there is an indication that a student 
subject to a school gun-possession statute had recently moved in inter-
state commerce, and if the statute does require that the possession is tied 
in some concrete way to interstate commerce, the statute may well sur-
vive constitutional scrutiny.125 
122. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 565-66. 
123. [d. at 566 (quoting Marbury v. Madison, I Cranch 137, 177 (1803)). 
124. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567. 
125. Indeed, following the Court's decision in Lopez, President Clinton proposed the "Gun-
Free School Zones Amendments Act of 1995", which provided the jurisdictional element for the 
Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990: "The legislative proposal would amend the Gun-Free School 
Zones Act by adding the requirement that the Government prove that the firearm has 'moved in or 
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Moreover, the Court's statement in Lopez that "[t]he possession of a 
gun in a school zone is in no sense an economic activity that might, 
through repetition elsewhere, substantially affect any sort of interstate 
commerce,,126 must be considered in light of the Court's immediately 
preceding comments concerning "legal uncertainty,,,127 and accordingly 
should be read so as to apply to the facts as they existed in Lopez , but 
not necessarily as a categorical statement that the act of possessing a gun 
in a school zone will never amount to an economic activity substantially 
affecting interstate commerce. It is unlikely that the Court, in literally the 
next sentence after speaking of the uncertain and imprecise "nature of 
things" in formulating legal determinations, would intend to issue an 
immutable categorical conclusion of this sort. 128 
It is necessary therefore to consider the individual law at issue in 
determining whether Congress has or has not acted within its constitu-
tional authority in promulgating legislation governing the possession of 
guns in schools. As the Court notes, "the question of congressional 
power under the Commerce Clause 'is necessarily one of degree''',129 and 
"any possible benefit from eliminating this 'legal uncertainty' [e.g., by 
issuing rigid categorical statements] would be at the expense of the Con-
stitution's system of enumerated powers.,,130 
In short, based on the unhappy developments of the last year 
spurred by and epitomized by the horrific events at Columbine, Congress 
should be able to establish sufficient justification 131 to withstand "rational 
basis" review by the Court. 132 
the possession of such firearm otherwise affects interstate commerce.' The addition of this 
jurisdictional element would limit the Act's 'reach to a discrete set of firearm possessions that 
additionally have an explicit connection with or effect on interstate commerce,' as the Court stated in 
and thereby bring it within the Congress' Commerce Clause authority." H.R. Doc. No. 104-72 
(1995). Congress never acted on this proposal. 
126. wpez. 514 U.S. at 567. 
127. See supra note 123 and accompanying text. 
128. Indeed, in his concurring opinion, lustice Kennedy describes his reasons for believing the 
holding should be limited: "The history of the judicial struggle to interpret the Commerce Clause 
during the transition from the economic system the Founders knew to the single, national market still 
emergent in our own era counsels great restraint before the Court determines that the Clause is 
insufficient to support an exercise of the national power. That history gives me some pause about 
today's decision, but I join the Court's opinion with [certain] observations on what I conceive to be 
its necessary though limited holding." wpez, 514 U.S. at 568 (Kennedy, 1., concurring). 
129. [d. at 555 (quoting NLRB v.lones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1,37 (1937». 
130. wpez. 514 U.S. at 566. 
131. As implied by the Court in wpez. such justification is all-but-required whenever 
Congress attempts to regulate an activity that lacks an intuitively-obvious link to interstate 
commerce. See supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text. 
132. See supra note 110 and accompanying text for discussion of standard of review. 
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CONCLUSION 
The events at Columbine High School in Littleton, Colorado on 
April 20, 1999 forever changed the contours of the national discussion 
about youth violence and guns in schools. This Article has argued that 
the events of Columbine and its aftermath should spur Congress to enact 
legislation to ban the possession of guns in schools. Such legislation is 
constitutionally supportable as a proper exercise of Congress' commerce 
power, despite the Supreme Court's 1995 Lopez v. u.S.133 opinion strik-
ing down the 1990 Gun Free School Zones Act. With Columbine, school 
attacks have crossed the threshold whereby they now potentially affect 
interstate commerce in a substantial sense. Indeed, some such attacks 
actually constitute acts of domestic terrorism, thus justifying federal leg-
islation to ban the possession of the major instruments of those attacks-
guns-in schools. To borrow from Justice Stevens' dissent in Lopez, 
"Whether or not the national interest in eliminating [the market for pos-
session of handguns in schools] would have justified federal legislation 
in [1995], it surely does today."I34 
133. 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
134. Lopez. 514 U.S. at 603 (Stevens, 1., dissenting). 
